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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

17 January, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Propositions on Soviet Arms Control Compliance

1. I used the attached paper on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements in a meeting this morning with Kenneth Dam and a group that he has been meeting with on arms control (Ikle, Perle, McFarlane, Gen. Gorman, Adm. Howe, Gen. Boverie).

2. Dam and Ikle suggested that an unclassified version of this paper might be useful in our public diplomacy on arms control. I told them that these points would be covered more fully in the two estimates in preparation (on Soviet objectives and on monitoring).

Henry S. Rowen
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Attachment

cc: DDI
C/ACIS
NIO/SP
NIO/USSR

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Propositions on Soviet Arms Control Compliance

1. Soviet compliance needs to be assessed in terms of Soviet aims and expectations as well as American ones. These are not the same. The Soviets perceive little mutual benefit from arms agreements.

- a. Their world view is dominated by conflict and arms control is, for the most part, an instrument in the struggle.
- b. We have depended disproportionately on nuclear threats, based earlier on a superior nuclear position, to block them -- mainly in Europe, but also elsewhere. Therefore, eroding the credibility of our nuclear strength has been and is a central Soviet strategic aim. Arms control agreements on nuclear weapons are a key element in their strategy, one on which they made great progress in the 1970s. To them, this aim, which centers on separating the US from its allies and shifting Europe toward neutralism, is what START and INF are largely about. They also must recognize that

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our current strategic programs, if fully implemented, will tip the balance substantially back in our direction.

- c. To these ends, they have specific weapon systems they want to protect and US and European ones they want to do in.
- d. There are some areas in which the Soviets perceive mutual interest (e.g., keeping radioactivity out of the atmosphere, avoiding incidents at sea, CBM and non-proliferation.)

2. The Soviets enter into arms control agreements expecting at most to conform to their terms narrowly defined.

- a. They have no interest in the "spirit" of the agreement. In the 1970s, while learning to play back to us American-style rhetoric about the destabilizing character of the "nuclear arms race" and the dangers of war through inadvertence, etc., their expenditures on nuclear systems and new systems developments proceeded on course.
- b. Their preferred way to gain advantage is to have their adversaries' publics put enough

pressure on their governments for them to make unilateral reductions or denials (e.g., ABM, M-X, Pershing II, GLCM). This required them to concede nothing.

- c. They will cooperate in, or insist on, leaving out of an agreement weapons categories that they especially value (e.g., in SALT, Soviet systems threatening Europe while arguing for the inclusion of US "Forward Based Systems", also extra "reload" missiles).
- d. For those weapons systems that are included in agreements, they closely define parameters to be protected. (e.g., in 1978, they insisted on the exclusion of "total impulse" in a list of constrained ICBM parameters so as to leave open the option of greatly increasing their throw weight potential.)
- e. Or they adhere to exploitable ambiguity in language (e.g., their resistance to defining "heavy missiles" in SALT I which protected their SS-19 ICBM about which we knew little in 1972; also exploiting ambiguity in the language in SALT II limiting encryption of telemetry.)

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- f. They exploit limitations in monitoring (e.g., the use of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan; uncertainty in our ability to estimate yields of underground nuclear tests).

3. The Soviets also engage in concealment and deception; e.g.:

- a. The hiding of true, and the publication of false, military budget data.
- b. Publication of distorted maps.
- c. Increasing denial of telemetry (and possibly allowing us access to biased telemetry).
- d. Misrepresentation of their force strength in Europe in the MBFR negotiation.
- e. Other concerns about deception.

4. The record of compliance:

- a. They have observed the force limits of SALT I and II (except for the reductions in SALT II which have not occurred because the Treaty hasn't entered in force).

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b. Questions about compliance include:

- The "Sverdlovsk incident" and use of toxins and chemical agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
- possible operational SS-16s at Plsesetsk.
- concurrent testing of ABM and air defense at Sary Shagan
- Telemetry encryption
- Violations of the TTBT
- Others

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